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whether to the will of God or some other authority sanctioned by the divine
(III.7, p. 265). He ties this in with his earlier theme of the rising danger of
religious intolerance of competing moral ideals:  In some such insidious form
there is at present a strong tendency to this narrow theory of life, and to the
pinched and hidebound type of human character which it patronizes (III.8, p.
265). That Christian theory contains a part of the truth. But it must be modified
and supplemented by other warranted opinions concerning what besides
obedience comprises an ideal moral character.
In particular, account must be taken of the value of self-assertion, not
merely the importance of obedience to rules:   Pagan self-assertion is one of
the elements of human worth, as well as  Christian self-denial  (III.8, p. 266;
quoting from Sterling, 1848, I, p. 190). He points to a  Greek ideal which
apparently combines these different sides of the truth into a  complete and
consistent whole . Since he explicitly mentions Pericles, that warranted character-
ideal might be referred to as Periclean. It apparently involves liberty and
spontaneity, duly balanced with self-government in the sense of freely choosing
to obey rules. Moreover, the cultivation of this Periclean ideal presupposes
individual rights to liberty within the self-regarding sphere, consistently mixed
with legitimate social enforcement of reasonable rules of conduct outside that
sphere.
Evidently, this  Greek ideal of character is not purely  Platonic since
Mill equates the latter with the  Christian ideal of self-government (III.8, p.
266). Rather than Periclean, it is sometimes labelled as Aristotelian, even though
the golden age of Pericles in Athens ended with the coming of the Peloponnesian
War about 431BC. Aristotle was born in 384BC, almost half a century after the
death of Pericles is recorded. The ideal might be referred to as Socratic, since
Socrates was a contemporary of Pericles. Yet Mill chooses to speak of Pericles.
A major reason for this may be that, in his view, Pericles anticipates the liberty
doctrine during the course of his great funeral oration (see Mill, 1853, pp. 333
4; for further discussion, see Riley, forthcoming b, Conclusion).
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Another reason may be to call attention to the fact that Pericles, in
addition to his attainments as a great political leader and orator, seems to have
done as he pleased in his self-regarding matters. As already mentioned in Part I,
he seems to have sustained a passionate love affair with Aspasia, a foreigner,
outside the marriage conventions of Athens. She was also apparently his trusted
political and philosophical adviser, as well as a teacher and confidante of Socrates.
Indeed, she seems to have advocated true love between equals as a model for all
intimate relationships (heterosexual and homosexual). Her unusual position, as
a woman not bound by social conventions and treated as an equal by men such
as Pericles and Socrates, apparently made her the object of severe criticism as
a whore, a manipulator of men, another Helen who instigated wars and so on.
Like Socrates, she was even formally charged with impiety, though her trial
ended in acquittal (after Pericles wept in open court for her release, so Plutarch
tells us). Perhaps Mill was even reminded by all this of his own beloved
Harriet, and of the hostility and stigma they faced as a result of their own
unconventional relationship.
Utilitarian case for the equal right to liberty (III.10 19)
Mill goes on to clarify his utilitarian form of argument for giving the individual
absolute liberty, by right, to choose among opinions and self-regarding acts in
accord with his own judgment and inclinations.
Self-development and true happiness (III.10)
For those who seek warranted opinions about their own feelings, who want
knowledge of which of their desires and impulses to strengthen and which to
weaken, the utility of liberty within the self-regarding sphere is clear: it is
essential to their self-development. Such persons recognize that choosing as
they like is essential to their progress toward an ideal moral character, which
reflects a warranted belief about their own happiness.
Complete liberty of self-regarding action is the very test of a true
conception of their personal utility, just as complete liberty of discussion is the
test of warranted opinions in general. Moreover, equal rights to liberty in self-
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